2
mences to operate in Manchuria the question of the maintenance of peace in that region. will become an international one. That would mean that in the Far East, which
peace is so necessary for us, would be guaranteed."
The "Svet" (of the extreme Right), considers that the American proposal is unacceptable, and says that Russia could not participate in an undertaking which would cause serious injury to her interests, and could not admit that an enterprise which had cost her so many sacrifices should pass into the hands of financiers, who only think of their own pockets.
The "Golos Pravdy," the Octobrist organ, is strongly against the proposal, which it regards as the expulsion of Russia from Manchuria, and the destruction of her position and of her prestige in the Far East. It asks what has occurred that Russia, and especially her far eastern frontier, should be treated in the manner of the American memorandum ? "In this historic note there is such a disregard of our interests in the Pacific Ocean, that we shall have to ponder deeply over our international position." 1 may add that M. Sazonow observed to me that the Finance Minister estimated the value of the Eastern Chinese Railway and the Russian interests which would be affected at 50,000,000l. As to the Chen-chow-Aigun line, M. Sazonow said that as far as Tsitsihar the projected line would be of more importance to Japan, but beyond that point it would be a matter of serious concern to Russia.
I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
CHINA RAILWAYS.
CONFIDENTIAL,
[1987]
[January 18,] Tops
CO
196
4196
SECTOR 11 FEB 10
No. 1.
Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.) (No. 30.) Sir.
St. Petersburgh, January 15, 1910. THE "Novoe Vremya," in an article on the proposed neutralisation of Manchuria which it publishes to-day, says that the communiqué of the telegraphic agency was so loosely worded that it has given rise to various false ideas. From the communiqué it might be supposed that the American Secretary of State, before dispatching his memorandum to the Powers, had already succeeded in securing a promise from the London Cabinet to support the American Government in their plans for the "trade neutralisation" of Northern Manchuria, As a matter of fact this was not the case, and could not be the case. On the 30th December, 1909 (the 12th January, 1910), there appeared in the columns of the "Novoe Vremya" the text of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of April 1899, by which Great Britain bound herself not to seek, on her own account or in the interests of British subjects or others, any railway concessions whatever to the north of the Great Wall of China. This agreement has not lost any of its force to-day, so that there can be no question of the London Cabinet giving any kind of promise in support of American proposals to acquire railway concessions of any kind in Northern Manchuria.
Novoe Vremya' states that it learns from unimpeachable sources that the British Government has never even thought of lending its authority to Mr. Knox's plans. England, in common with every other civilised Power, has no objection in principle to any proposal which aims ostensibly at removing causes of international friction. In the present instance, however, the London Cabinet has imposed as condition of its participation in the Manchurian neutralisation scheme that the Powers most interested in the matter, i.e., Russia and Japan, should come to a preliminary agreement on the subject. In his aide-mémoire Mr. Knox apparently made no mention of this condition on the part of the British Government, the result of which has been that a conditional acceptance was converted into complete agreement. It stands to reason that serious statesmen proposing to the Powers an international plan of such vast importauce cannot act in such a manner. It was possible, of course, that Mr. Knox did not regard his own proposal with seriousness. In that case it is regrettable that the Chief Adviser of the President of the United States did not postpone his jest to the 1st April, when, according to American ideus of political humour, it might perhaps have been justified.
-- The
The Novoe Vremya" goes on to say that in a previous article, devoted to a discussion of the American proposal, it explained that the motive of the American Government was to create new markets for American industry, but that the diplomatic methods now disclosed compel it to modify this explanation. A person of average or even less intelligence would understand that, sooner or later, Great Britain's true attitude to the plan for intervention in Russo-Japanese-Chinese affairs will be disclosed, and that then there will be only one of two possible conclusions: either that Mr. Knox is incapable of understanding the simplest diplomatic documents, or that he purposely Whichever of these resorts to perversion of their sense for some ulterior motive. conclusions prove the true one, either of them would prevent negotiations being begun between Mr. Knox and the diplomatists of Europe and Asia. In these circumstances it would be futile to consider an American proposal based, not on the well-known common-sense of America, but on--rather naïve diplomatic humour-a New Year's joke of rather bad taste. In a
previous article the Novoe Vremya" pointed out the acceptability in principle of the alternative proposal of Mr. Knox respecting the construction by an international syndicate of a line from Chinchow to Aigun. The "Novoe Vremya" in their present article disclaims any change of principle, but says that it can only give practical consideration to the American proposal when on the American side there is a serious statesman and not a diplomatist of the school of Mr. Knox, who considers it permissible, in the most important international questions, to have recourse to playful omission of the most essential portions of diplomatic correspondence. The question of the construction in Manchuria of new railways
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